On December 30, 2024, MiCA came into force in Europe, and what many in fintech had not taken seriously until the last moment has started. It seemed that Europe would talk and never do, allowing USDT to remain the foundation of the market. But in practice, the delisting of USDT became a new reality for the entire European payment infrastructure: Coinbase removed the token for Europeans as early as December 2024, by March 2025 Kraken introduced a "sell-only" mode, and Binance completely closed pairs for the EU. It seemed temporary, but now the situation has taken a different turn.
Europe is against USDT, while the rest of the world is working with it as usual. For example, just recently, on December 22, 2025, the financial regulator of Abu Dhabi (ADGM) officially approved USDT on the TRON network as a regulated asset in the country. This has created an unexpected precedent for international payment companies: the same token is banned in Europe and fully legalized in the UAE within a short period of time.
Cryptocurrency was conceived as a borderless tool, but now geography affects crypto operations more than anything else. How do we manage day to day operations in this operation?
In payment processing, interoperability of tools has always been a key factor in choice: the convenience of settlements and convertibility allowed working with various partners and clients. When everyone around accepts USDT, there is no need to think about which cryptocurrency to use for payments; transactions go through quickly and smoothly. On the other hand, fragmentation creates difficulties and additional losses on exchange rates. This is exactly what regulators have achieved today. Now the Western world chooses regulated and transparent USDC, while other countries do not abandon the familiar USDT.
Speaking of Europe, MiCA requires that stablecoins be issued by licensed issuers, undergo audits, and maintain financial reserves within the EU. Tether did not comply with these conditions, which automatically placed USDT in the red zone for all regulated EU institutions. For a licensed payment company, this immediately turned into the loss of official channels in the European direction. An important nuance is that peer-to-peer transfers are still technically possible, but building a sustainable business model on P2P schemes is quite difficult. When working with France or Germany today, you need USDC, as users will not be able to top up their balances through legal exchanges otherwise. Merchants are also under pressure: they must accept payments in methods that are convenient for users and are available.
On the other pole are the UAE, Singapore, and Japan. ADGM created clear regulation where institutional settlement in USDT is legal and transparent. Here, a payment company can work with stablecoins completely officially, without fearing sudden blockages from correspondent banks. The situation in the US is more complicated: recently adopted GENIUS Act and the launch of the USAT token confirm that for operations in Western jurisdictions, payment systems will have to support segmented versions of stablecoins for specific markets. The era of "one dollar in the blockchain" has ended, giving way to the stage of regional tokens. As soon as most countries start operating their CBDCs, fragmentation may become even stronger.
For a payment company, dependence on a single stablecoin in 2026 has turned into a critical infrastructure vulnerability. The most obvious risk is the sudden loss of a payment corridor. Relying on one option, you may not have time to react to a sharp change in regulatory conditions, which, as we see, happens quite often. Most did not have a backup plan at the time MiCA came into force, which led to frozen balances and reputational losses.
The second factor is the increase in operational costs for creating bridges between networks. Transferring USDT from TRON to Ethereum, then converting it to USDC and sending it to the client consumes from 1% to 3% of each transaction. On small amounts, this completely kills the margin, turning operations into constant exchanges. Added to this is the problem of stuck liquidity: when a company has €500,000 in USDT on TRON, and a European client demands an urgent payout in USDC on Ethereum, it is necessary to urgently convert at an unfavorable spread.
Traditional banks, in turn, have begun to more strictly filter PSPs by crypto activity. If a payment provider continues to work with unregulated stablecoins, the bank may unilaterally terminate the relationship, citing compliance risks. This is especially relevant for European banks after the introduction of MiCA. Even if the PSP itself is formally legal, one element in the chain puts the entire settlement scheme at risk. Supporting multicurrency and the ability to quickly convert assets add costs, but now these are basic elements of survival.
Under current conditions, the strategy for PSPs requires a transition to a multicurrency architecture that takes into account the regulatory landscape of each specific operational zone. We highlight four key development vectors for payment systems in 2026:
In the end, the success of a payment company today depends on the ability to turn regulatory barriers into technological opportunities. The only way to guarantee uninterrupted payment flow is to support the maximum number of payment paths while maintaining profitability, as all of them add costs.
Those who are not ready for rapid asset rotation within their gateway will inevitably face difficulties and losses. The segmentation of stablecoins almost completely nullifies their original value: universality. But within the global economy, it is difficult to come up with a scheme that will equally suit all states, and if a company operates in the international market, adapting to all legislations equally complicates matters.